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Abstract This paper develops a framework that allows the order in which consumers visit
firms to depend on a priori available product information and consumer preferences. Con-
sumers first visit the firm which is most likely to offer the product best to their liking. Prices
and profits turn out to be higher than under the traditional assumption of a random search
order. Under the proposed search rule consumers obtain on average a better match and
search less often. These gains in efficiency result in higher total welfare, although consumers
are worse off under the alternative search rule due to higher prices.
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1 Introduction
On many markets there are multiple suppliers who offer products which differ in several
dimensions and, in order to find the best offer on the market, consumers will have to search.
Consumers might search randomly amongst the options, however, one’s preferences might
influence the search order. For instance, if one wants to decide what to watch on television,
one can consult websites which suggest programs based on the preferences entered in an
earlier stage. If one wants to buy a new DVD, shopping websites suggest titles based on the
order history. When people are using an online search engine or comparison website to find
a product, they might enter not only the product name but also specify some characteristics
they like. If a person wants to purchase a car with high MPG, she will not start shopping at
a car-dealer who advertises SUV’s. Similarly, an employee of a bookstore will not suggest to
start looking in the comics section when a consumer indicates that she likes classical literature.
It is clear that consumers often start searching where they are likely to find a product close
to their preferences, and this choice can be made after consulting advertisements, comparison
websites, consultancy agencies, or acquaintances.
The existing literature does not allow consumer preferences and available product infor-
mation to play a role in the consumers search process. This paper takes this assumption
away. To model the role of the preferences in the search order, I assume that a product con-
sists of so-called communicable and incommunicable horizontal characteristics. Consider, for
instance, a consumer wanting to buy a laptop. In order to find a suitable model she gathers
information. For instance by visiting a comparison website and entering her preferences on
communicable attributes, such as screen size and color. Based upon this information a ranking
of suppliers is obtained by the consumer and she can calculate the utility associated with the
communicated characteristics. The consumer then visits the top suggested firm in order to
find out its price and inspect the product’s incommunicable characteristics, such as whether
the laptop is convenient to handle and whether the screen is readable from different angles.
She can then buy the laptop or decide to continue her search until she does find an offer to
her liking. For simplicity this paper assumes that if the consumer decides to continue her
search, she does so in a random fashion and does not use the provided ranking any further. I
expect, however, that my findings carry over to the more general framework in which she does
use it. Furthermore, note that my model can also be justified if one is willing to assume that
consumers forget about the ranking of firms once they visit the first firm or when the source
of the consumer’s information (comparison website/acquaintances/consultancy agencies) only
provides the best suggestion.
I find that prices and profits are higher when consumers use provided product information
in their search process. This is because firms exploit the fact that consumers first visit the firm
with the highest communicable attributes and are therefore less likely to visit a competitor.
In effect, products are ex-ante less homogeneous for consumers when product characteristics
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are communicated.
My model extends the seminal work of Anderson and Renault (1999). In that article
consumers visit firms in a random order, by introducing communicable characteristics I allow
consumer preferences to influence the search order. When, in my framework, a product only
consists of incommunicable characteristics consumers search at random and the model of
Anderson and Renault (1999) results. However, when all product characteristics are available
to consumers prior to search the Diamond (1971) paradox emerges. The result in Anderson
and Renault (1999) that prices are non-decreasing in search costs carries over to my work.
This paper provides some interesting insights on the welfare effects of search as well. When
product information is used to determine the search order consumers obtain on average a
better match, as they start searching at the firm where they are most likely to find the product
that fits their tastes the best. Moreover, consumers are less likely to continue search in each
stage of the process. This is because they know that for certain characteristics the product of
the first firm is the best on the market. Hence, consumers spend less on search costs. These
two effects ensure that total welfare is higher under this alternative search strategy than in
case of random search. However, consumers turn out to be worse off under the alternative
search strategy as these two effects are outweighed by the higher prices consumers pay.
My findings contribute to the literature on consumer search with differentiated products,
which is built around the classic papers by Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999).
These and subsequent works often assume totally random search by consumers amongst firms.
However, there are some exceptions. Arbatskaya (2007) considers a market with homogeneous
products where consumers face heterogeneous search costs and search in an exogenously given
order. Firms have knowledge about this search order, and they charge higher prices when
they are visited in an early stage. In the work of Zhou (2011) consumers also search in a
fixed order, however, products are horizontally differentiated. He finds that prices increase
in the search order, since firms visited in a later stage exploit the fact that consumers who
sample them must have relatively low valuations for the offered product of earlier sampled
firms. Other literature in which the search order is non-random includes Wilson (2010), who
considers a homogeneous good market in which firm’s search costs are endogenized. Firms
can obfuscate, which makes it more time-consuming for consumers to inspect a product and
learn its price. In equilibrium Wilson finds that consumers are more likely to visit a firm with
low search costs. A similar approach is taken by Ellison and Wolitzky (2013), but they assume
consumers can not observe the level of obfuscation prior to arrival. In the empirical work of
Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) the sampling probability of a firm is proxied by advertising
expenditures. Haan and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2011) and Armstrong et al. (2009) also consider
non-random search models. Armstrong et al. (2009) allow one firm to be prominent in the
market, and this firm is always sampled first. I, however, do not impose this a-symmetry and,
a priori, every firm is equally likely to be sampled first by a consumer. Moreover, and most
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importantly, in my case the sampling depends on consumer preferences. The work by Haan
and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2011) takes a different approach. They consider a consumer search
model in which consumers first visit the firm whose advertising is most salient. Finally, Haan
et al. (2015) consider a duopoly in which prices are advertised along with some product
characteristics. Consumers first sample the firm at which they expect to find the best deal, as
in my model. They find that prices are decreasing in search costs because it is more important
to attract consumers on their first visit when these costs are high.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In
section 3 equilibrium prices are derived. Section 4 presents the benchmark model. Compar-
ative statics are discussed in section 5. In section 6 I conduct a welfare-analysis. Section 7
concludes.
2 The model
I consider a market with n ≥ 2 firms selling horizontally differentiated products. Firms
face constant marginal costs, which I normalize to zero. Demand is assumed to be inelastic.
Without loss of generality the market size is normalized to 1. A consumer buying from firm
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} receives utility
ui = (1− λ)εi + λvi − pi.
Here pi is the price charged. (1−λ)εi+λvi is the stochastic match value between a consumer
and product i. Match values are independently distributed across products, moreover, I
assume εi and vi are independently distributed random variables. εi is the realization of a
distribution F and is referred to as the Incommunicable Part of the Match Value, IPMV
henceforth. vi is the realization of a distribution H and is referred to as the Communicable
Part of the Match Value, CPMV from now on. The total stochastic match value, denoted by
ti = (1− λ)εi + λvi, has a distribution which is the weighted convolution of F and H, which
is denoted by M . Let f , h and m be the densities associated with F , H and M , respectively.
f and h are taken to be continuous. [aF , bF ] and [aH , bH ] respectively denote the supports of
F and H on the extended real line. Let the bounds on ti be denoted by
a = (1− λ)aF + λaH and b = (1− λ)bF + λbH .
Firms can not discriminate in prices as they are unable to observe match values. In order
to find the best combination of match value and price consumers search sequential among
firms with perfect recall. The price charged by a firm can only be discovered by visiting the
firm, for which a consumer has to incur search cost s. Consumers have some information
about the match with firms and use this to determine their search order. This strategy is
presented below, and will be referred to as directed search.
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Stage 1 Consumers are informed about which firm has the highest CPMV on the market,
for example by means of a comparison website, advertisements, an acquaintance, or an
intermediary. One might imagine a consumer looking to buy a laptop consulting an
advisor. The advisor knows some of the characteristics of the laptops on offer on the
market. For instance, she knows which suppliers offer laptops with small screens and are
convenient to travel with or which firms sale laptops with Arabic or American keyboards.
However, before buying a laptop a consumer might also want to consider how it handles
and whether the screen is readable from different angles. Hence, the advisor knows the
communicable characteristics a consumer would get if she would buy from a particular
supplier, but has no information about the incommunicable characteristics. When the
consumer visits the advisor, she reveals her preferences. Based on this information, the
advisor tells the consumer at which supplier she is expected to find a laptop that fits
her preferences the best. The consumer can then calculate the CPMV based upon this
information.2
Stage 2 The consumer first visits the firm with the highest CPMV. Upon arrival she observes
the price the firm is charging and the total match value of the product, including the
IPMV. The consumer takes this into account when calculating the expected benefit of
continuing search, which she compares to the costs of doing so. If the search costs are
higher than the expected benefit of search she will buy at the current supplier, otherwise
the consumer continues her search by randomly visiting another firm. In calculating
the expected benefit of searching, the consumer incorporates the fact that for any other
product the CPMV is smaller than at the first firm.3
Notice that the directed search rule is a generalization of the one presented in the standard
consumer search models, see for instance Anderson and Renault (1999). In those models, con-
sumers search completely at random without using any product information. The assumption
of not using product information is relaxed in my model by allowing consumers to determine
the first shop they visit based on the advise of intermediating agencies, advertisements, or
comparison websites.
2Notice that the model allows for the case that the consumer is not able to make her preferences fully
known to the advisor. This friction can be captured in the IPMV. The advise of the intermediating firm might
not be optimal due to this lack of knowledge, and consumers might for this reason find a better product on
the market if they continue their search beyond the advised firm.
3The model allows for an alternative interpretation. In that case consumers obtain all the CPMV’s in Stage
1 (possibly through reading advertisements) and visit in Stage 2 the firm with the highest CPMV first. If
a consumer decides to search onwards, she does not use the information of the CPMV’s of the other firms,
possibly because she forgot them. Only the CPMV value of the first firm is then used under directed search.
Future research might still look into the possibility of generalizing the search rule further and allowing for the
consumer to remember every CPMV. In such a model the consumer faces, in each stage, a different expected
benefit of continuing search, depending on the CPMV of the next best firm. This complicates the model
severely.
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3 The pricing Nash equilibrium
In this section I derive a symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices. As I look for a symmetric
Nash equilibrium, I need to consider the best response of firm i ∈ {1, . . . , n} when all other
firms set some price p∗. Setting p∗ should be optimal for firm i as well. Below I derive the
demand and profit function for firm i.
Consider a consumer before entering the market. She gets informed about which firm has
vm = maxj∈{1,...,n}{vj}, the highest CPMV, and she visits this firm first. Suppose a consumer
has decided to visit firm i first: vm = vi. If she decides to buy from firm i she will receive
an utility of (1 − λ)εi + λvi − pi. If she continues search and buys from firm j she receives
(1 − λ)εj + λvj − p∗. Define ∆ = pi − p∗ and x ≡ (1 − λ)εi + λvi −∆. When the consumer
arrives at firm i she learns x. The consumer is better off at firm j when tj > x. The expected
benefit of continuing searching (net of search costs) from firm i is thus given by:






((1− λ)εj + λvj − x)f(εj)dεj h(vj)
H(vm)
dvj .
Notice that the consumer does take into account that she has already visited the firm with
CPMV vm and therefore the CPMV’s for the remaining firms will be lower. This is why the
conditional density h(vj)/H(vm) figures in this expression.
g(x, vm) is strictly decreasing in x and goes from +∞ to zero as x goes from −∞ to +∞.
Let xˆ be implicitly defined by g(xˆ, vm) = s, which exists and is unique for each vm given the
above and s ∈ (0,∞). It follows that for a consumer it is beneficial to continue search if the
total match value at a firm is lower than xˆ. Notice that xˆ depends on vm, moreover, the
random search model a` la Anderson and Renault (1999) is obtained when vm is replaced by
bH in g(x, vm) or when λ = 0. In addition, as s > 0, xˆ < (1− λ)bF + λvm.
I now derive demand for firm i. As I am considering a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the
consumer expects that every shop is charging price p∗, and does not anticipate firm i charging
pi. Suppose vi = vm, so a consumer arrives at firm i first. This consumer does not continue
her search and buys from firm i whenever (1−λ)εi +λvm > xˆ. This happens, for a given vm,





. The probability that the firm i has the highest CPMV
on the market is H(vm)
n−1. Therefore, the fraction of the population arriving at i first and
staying there to buy can be found by multiplying these two terms, weighing this term with














Now suppose firm i is visited as lth firm, l ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Let the subscripts of the CPMV
6
and IPMV denote the order in which firms are visited. In this scenario the consumer must
have visited first a firm with CPMV vm and she must have rejected the deal offered there.





. Subsequently the consumer must
have visited firms 2 up till and including l − 1 and also rejected their offers, implying that
(1−λ)εj +λvj < xˆ for j ∈ {2, . . . , l−1}. The probability that the consumer continues search










When the consumer arrives after l − 1 firms at firm i she should buy there. Hence, we need










These probabilities already impose that vj < vm for j ∈ {2, . . . , l− 1}.and vi < vm. However,
we also need that vj < vm for the firms the consumer does not visit, which is captured by
the factor H(vm)
n−l. By taking these factors into account, weighing them with the density
of vm, and by integrating over vm one finds that the probability that a consumer buys from























In addition there are consumers who buy from firm i after they initially rejected its
offer and visited all firms. The term comebacks will be used for these consumers. First
consider consumers who visited firm i first (vi = maxj∈{1,...,n}{vj}) and return there in the






. Therefore, we find that demand for firm i from comebacks who

















where the upperbound on the second integral ensures that initially the consumer continued
search from firm i. Now consider consumers who visit firm i as firm l ∈ {2, . . . , n}, so vi < vm,
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and buys there after considering all the other offers on the market. Similarly as above, we
find that this happens with probability:
Y 2(pi, p























It follows that total demand for firm i charging pi, given all other firms charge p
∗, is:
DD(pi, p




∗) + Y 1(pi, p∗) + Y 2(pi, p∗). (3)
Profits of firm i are then given by
Π(pi, p
∗) = piDD(pi; p∗). (4)
Proposition 1. Let f and h be continuously differentiable densities on the supports [aF , bF ]
and [aH , bH ]. Furthermore, let 0 < s < E(ti) − a. When the symmetric Nash equilibrium








with equilibrium profits Π∗ = p
∗
n . A sufficient condition for existence of the equilibrium is
f ′(ε) ≥ 0 ∀ε. In the case of λ = 1 or s ≥ E(ti)−a, firms charge infinite prices in equilibrium.
It is necessary that s > 0, otherwise consumers search freely, and a situation of perfect
information occurs in which prices will drop to zero. The condition s < E(ti)− a is imposed
to ensure that there is search on the market. If this requirement would not be met, search cost
would be so high that it is unbeneficial for consumers to search onward if all firms charge the
same price, even if the match value at the current firm is the worst possible. Anderson and
Renault (1999) already pointed to the similarity of this setting to that of Diamond (1971): for
any price set by the competitors, a firm can increase its price without affecting its demand.
Hence, in equilibrium all firms set infinite prices. I find that this situation is analogous to
that of the case of λ = 1 under the directed search regime.
Equation (5) is found by equating the derivative of (4) at p∗ to zero. The remainder of the
proof that (5) gives a global maximum when f ′(ε) ≥ 0 ∀ε is presented in Appendix A. The
Diamond-type argument that prices and profits go to infinity when s ≥ E(ti) − a is trivial
and is omitted.
The condition f ′(ε) ≥ 0 ∀ε is satisfied by the uniform distribution, and more generally
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for any distribution F (ε) = εκ with κ ≥ 1. Establishing the existence of equilibrium for the
somewhat more general conditions given by Anderson and Renault (1999) is not my central
concern. This paper’s aim is to quantify the value of information.
Note that the Proposition does not treat the case λ = 0. In that case consumers do
not value the CPMV and basing their search order upon it makes no sense. The model
then collapses to that of random search, which is treated in the next section and acts as a
benchmark.
4 Benchmark
I now derive equilibrium prices under the assumption of random search. The price in the
symmetric Nash equilibrium under this scenario is denoted by pr. The demand of firm i
under the random search rule can be derived similar fashion as above and in the expression

















































as R(x¯, bH) = M(x¯). Here x¯ solves g(x, bH) = s. Since s > 0, x¯ < b.





Proposition 2. Let f and h be continuously differentiable densities on the supports [aF , bF ]
and [aH , bH ]. Furthermore, let 0 < s < E(ti) − a. When the symmetric Nash equilibrium








with equilibrium profits Π∗r = p
r
n . A sufficient condition for existence is of the equilibrium is
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f ′(εi) ≥ 0. In the case of s ≥ E(ti)− a, firms charge infinite prices in equilibrium.
A proof of this Proposition can be found in Anderson and Renault (1999).
5 Comparative statics
Due to the complexity of the model I restrict attention to standard uniformly distributed
CPMV and IPMV and 2 firms in the remainder of this section. Moreover, I assume λ ∈ (0, 0.5]
and that search costs are sufficiently small: s ≤ 1−λ8 . This last condition ensures that there
will be no consumers who refrain from searching beyond the first sampled firm even before
they know the realization of the IPMV. Appendix B includes a proof of this last claim and
presents several Lemma’s in which xˆ, x¯, ∂D
D
∂pi
(p∗, p∗) and ∂D
r
∂pi
(pr, pr) are derived explicitly for
uniformly distributed match values and 2 firms. Using these Lemma’s and numerical methods
the following set of Propositions is derived.
Proposition 3. p∗ ≥ pr.
The Proposition states that firms charge higher prices when consumers use directed instead
of random search. Under directed search consumers will first visit the firm that offers the
product with the highest expected utility, which reduces demand elasticity.
One interpretation of the result is that disclosing product’s horizontal attributes leads to
higher prices. This is also found Meurer and Stahl (1994) and Anderson and Renault (2009),
although in different settings. These papers consider buyers who observe prices and are not
able to search for the best product match. However, some consumers might be informed
about product characteristics through advertising, which leads to higher prices.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium price p∗ is non-decreasing in search costs.
The intuition behind this result is that when search costs are higher it is more costly for
consumers to inspect the option at the next firm. Firms know that consumers are thus less
likely to continue searching and will charge a higher price. For the equilibrium price under
random search, pr, a similar result can be established, see Anderson and Renault (1999).
Proposition 5.
1. p∗ is decreasing in the CPMV weight λ if s < s˜, where s˜ is a function of λ.
2. p∗ is increasing in λ if s > s˜.
This Proposition is the result of two mechanisms which work in opposite directions. To
see this, first consider the impact of λ upon the prices under random search, pr. A change in
λ does not effect the search decision of consumers directly, as they search random. However,
the change does affect the distribution of the total match value, ti = (1 − λ)εi + λvi. An
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increase in λ ∈ (0, 0.5) leads to a lower variance of ti, but leaves its expected value unaffected.
A lower variation in the total match value means less product differentation. As Anderson
and Renault (1999) shows, less differentiation leads to less monopoly power for firms and
thus lower prices. When consumers use directed search the increase of λ has the additional
effect that consumers are better informed: for a larger part of the match value they know
that the first firm they visit offers the best option. Hence, the expected return from searching
decreases in λ under directed search and leads to upward pressure on prices. This effect only
dominates the other effect when search costs are sufficiently large. After all, when search
costs are small consumers are likely to search onward, even if the weight on the CPMV is
increased.
The discussion above shows that λ can not directly be interpreted as the amount of
product information made available to consumers, as a change of it alters the distribution of
the match value as well. Hence, λ should be fixed and the CPMV might be used to determine
the search order or not.
Corollary 1. Π∗ ≥ Π∗r.
Proof of Corollary 1. All firms have an equal market share (1/2) in each equilibrium, as
they charge the same price as their competitor, whether search is random or directed. The
result now follows, since p∗ ≥ pr by Lemma 3. 
The Propositions in this section are established for uniformly distributed match values
and a duopoly. Model complexity prevents me to generalize these results or establish them
analytically. However, I do allow for more general distributions and more than 2 firms when
analyzing the welfare effects of product information in the next section.
6 Welfare
Throughout this section I assume that λ 6= 0 and s > 0. It is convenient to define
tmi = (1− λ)εi + λvm, with vm ≥ vj ∀j.
Proposition 6. Consumers search strictly less under directed search than under random
search. In each stage of the search process the consumers is less likely to continue search
when using directed search.
Proof of Proposition 6. First consider the decision whether to continue search when a
consumer has already arrived at at least two firms. Recall ti = (1 − λ)εi + λvi. Notice
that the maximum of n − 1 independent random variables with distribution H has (n −
1)H(vm)
n−2h(vm) as its probability density function. Under directed search a consumer
11































which is exactly the probability of continuing search under random search. Hence, under the
directed regime the consumer who has already left the first firm continues searching at most
as often as in the random search regime.
Now consider the probability of searching under the different regimes when a consumer
has arrived at the first firm. In the random search case one has a match value of ti while
under the directed regime one has a match value tmi . Straightforwardly, one obtains Pr[ti ≤
x¯] ≥ Pr[tmi ≤ x¯] ≥ Pr[tmi ≤ xˆ]. The first inequality holds strictly if vi 6= vm. So, a consumer
under the directed regime is less likely to continue search from the first firm than under the
random search rule. Therefore, expected search expenditures are strictly lower under the
directed regime. 
Proposition 7. The expected total match value a consumer obtains under directed search is
higher than under random search.
Proof of Proposition 7. The possibility of consumers returning to a firm after visiting all
firms is irrelevant for the analysis. When such an event happens, the expected match value a
consumer obtains is the same under random and directed search because she can choose from
the same set of firms. Let vm, the highest CPMV on the market, be fixed. Define
Z = λvm + E[(1− λ)εj ] and W = E[λvi + (1− λ)εi|vi < vm].
Z is the expected match value of the firm with the highest CPMV, say firm j. W is the
expected match value at the other firms. Notice that Z ≥ W . The likelihood of a consumer
arriving at firm j equals 1 under directed search, as this firm will be sampled first. Under
random search it is strictly lower as a consumer might sample another firm first and buy
there. To show that the expected match value under directed search is higher it thus suffices
to show that consumers are less likely to continue search from firm j. Under random search
this happens with probability Pr[tmj ≤ x¯] as consumers do not realize this is the firm with the
highest CPMV. Under directed search it is lower and equals Pr[tmj ≤ xˆ]. 
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For an individual consumer it is optimal to minimize the search costs and maximize the
expected match value. In both cases directed search outperforms random search, implying
that this will be the strategy followed by consumers. Moreover, as prices are merely transfers
in a covered market, total welfare is higher under the directed regime than under the random
search.4
Corollary 2. Total welfare under directed search is higher than under random search.
Having considered total welfare and profits I now turn to consumer welfare. I derive an
expression for the expected match value and search expenditures under directed and random
search. I start with directed search. Notice that nH(vm)
n−1 is the density of the maximum of
n CPMV’s and (n−1)H(vm)n−2 that of the maximum of n−1 CPMV’s. Hence, the expected
match from buying at the first firm equals












while the expected match from buying directly from the lth visited firm, l ∈ {2, . . . , n}, equals









1− F ( xˆ−λv1−λ )
h(v)(n− 1)H(vm)n−2h(vm)dεdvdvm.
When a consumer returns to an earlier visited firm her expected match is the expectation of
the maximum of n match values. By considering first the case that maxi=1,...n{ti} 6= tm and
































































ensure ti ≥ tj .
4If the model would allow for nonpurchase than the higher equilibrium prices under directed search might




∗, p∗) consumers who buy at the first firm they arrive at. Here Q1(p∗, p∗)
is given in equation (1), this term is multiplied with n as there are n firms active who can
have the highest CPMV for a consumer. Similarly, the number of consumers buying from
firm l ∈ {2, . . . , n} without having visited it before is given by (n − l + 1)Ql(p∗, p∗), where
Ql(p
∗, p∗) is given in (2). Finally, the number of comebacks on the market is given by










Using these expressions I find that total welfare under directed search is given by
SWD = nQ1(p
∗, p∗)[−s+ E(tmi |tmi > xˆ)] +
n∑
l=2
(n− l + 1)Ql(p∗, p∗)[−ls+ E(ti|ti > xˆ)]




















∣∣∣∣ti < x¯)] .
Corollary 2 established that SWD > SWR. However, Proposition 3 shows that p
∗ ≥ pr.
So, on the one hand, consumers pay higher prices under the directed search regime, but on the
other hand, they obtain a higher match values and spend less on search cost when searching
directly. I evaluate SWD − p∗ − (SWR − pr) to determine whether consumers are worse off
under directed search. I apply numerical methods due to the complexity of the expression.
Again I will restrict attention to sufficiently small search costs, uniformly distributed CPMV’s
and IPMV’s, λ ∈ (0, 0.5] and n = 2. Appendix B presents for this setting ∂DD∂pi (p∗, p∗) and
∂Dr
∂pi
(pr, pr) from which p∗ and pr directly follow. I find the following result.
Proposition 8. Consumer surplus under directed search is lower than under random search.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I incorporated the idea that consumers base the order in which they visit
firms on their own preferences and available product information. Consumers might derive
this information from for instance advertisements, comparison websites, acquaintances or
consultancy agencies. Based on the gained information consumers first sample the firm where
they expect to find the product that gives them the highest utility. The model fits into the
literature on consumer search with differentiated products.
Under the alternative search rule which I propose I find that prices and profits are higher
14
as compared to the case of random search, which is generally assumed by the literature. The
driving force behind this result is that firms realize that consumers will first sample the firm
at which they expect to find the product that fits their tastes the best. This gives firms some
monopoly power over these consumers, which is exploited in equilibrium. Disclosing product
information effectively allows firms to differentiate their products and charge higher prices.
In line with existing literature I find that prices are increasing in search costs, as higher
search costs reduce demand elasticity. In the extreme case when all product characteristics
are communicable to consumers prior to search the Diamond paradox arises again.
Total welfare is higher when consumers use directed rather than random search. This
is the result of two effects. First, consumers obtain on average a higher match value under
directed search. This is because they start their search at a firm which offers a product that,
in certain dimensions, fits their tastes the best. Second, consumers are less likely to search
onward in each stage of the process when they use directed search. This is because they know
they will never find a product that fits their preferences better for certain aspects.
Consumer welfare turns out to be lower under directed search, as the positive effects of
better matches and lower search expenditures are outweighed by the higher prices.
Future research might extend the presented model and allow the entire search order to
depend upon available product information and consumer preferences. Such an extension
is far from trivial since it takes away the stationary character of the search process as the
expected benefit of continuing search will then depend upon the available product information
of the next best firm.
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A General distributions
First I give a useful Lemma and its proof.






((1− λ)εj + λvj − x)f(εj)dεj h(vj)H(vm)dvj is decreasing in x and
increasing in vm. In addition, xˆ ≤ x¯ where xˆ solves g(x, vm) = s and x¯ solves g(x, b) = s.
Proof of Lemma 1. By inspecting the expression of g(x, vm) it immediately follows that it






































g(x, vm) is increasing in vm. Combining these results gives xˆ ≤ x¯. 
Proof of Proposition 1. I show that profit function is concave for λ ∈ (0, 1), the case λ = 1
will be treated later. Define
ui = εi − ∆
1− λ and Θ =
{














































































































5Start the computation with the first term after the equality sign. Apply integration by parts on the inner in-




′(ui)dx = α( xˆ−λvm1−λ )β(
xˆ−λvm
1−λ )−α(aF− ∆1−λ )β(aF− ∆1−λ )−∫
Θ
β(ui)α

























′(ui)dui to the other side of the equality sign then gives the result. In Anderson
and Renault (1999) a similar approach is used to calculate DA(pi, p
∗) and DB(pi, p∗) at page 733.







































1− λ, vi, vm
)]
h(vi)dvih(vj)dvm. (13)






















































































































































It follows that every term in (14), and therefore demand, is non-increasing in pi.
Let pik(pi, p




∗)h(vm)dvm. I show pik(pi, p∗) is concave for all k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.



















































































































































































All terms in the expression are non-positive since f ′(ε) ≥ 0 ∀ε, which leads to the conclusion
that pi4(pi, p
∗) is concave.
Because the sum of concave functions is concave it follows by these arguments that a
sufficient condition for the symmetric Nash equilibrium to exists is f ′(ε) ≥ 0 ∀ε when λ ∈
(0, 1).
Now suppose λ = 1. Then consumers perfectly observe the entire match value in the first
stage of the game, and the IPMV is zero. However, they still have to search for the best
price. An argument that is analogous to that of Diamond shows that the best response to
any market price is an increase of the price. Prices will explode under the covered market
assumption. 
B Uniformly distributed match values
To derive an explicit expressions for ∂D
D
∂pi
(p∗, p∗) and ∂D
r
∂pi
(pr, pr) it is convenient to write out
the density of a convex combination of two uniformly distributed variables.
The convolution of two uniform distributions. Let X and Y be uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, bF ] and [0, bH ], respectively. The density of Z = λY + (1 − λ)X, denoted by
m, is given by:
m(z) =

0 if z ≤ 0
z
λbH(1−λ)bF if z ∈ (0,min{λbH , (1− λ)bF }]
min{λbH ,(1−λ)bF }
λbH(1−λ)bF if z ∈ [min{λbH , (1− λ)bF ,max{λbH , (1− λ)bF }]
λbH+(1−λ)bF−z
λbH(1−λ)bF if z ∈ [max{λbH , (1− λ)bF }, λbH + (1− λ)bF )
0 if z ≥ λbH + (1− λ)bF .
Moreover, the following Lemma will be useful.
Lemma 2. For uniformly distributed match values and λ ∈ (0, 0.5] the following statements
hold.
(a) When s ∈ [ λ2v2m6(1−λ) , 1−λ8 ] then xˆ = 1− λ+ 12λvm −
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12 .
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(b) When s ∈ [ λ26(1−λ) , 1−λ8 ] then x¯ = 1− 12λ−
√
2(1− λ)s− λ212 .
(c) When s < λ
2v2m
6(1−λ) then xˆ = 1− λ+ λvm − (6vmλ(1− λ)s)1/3.
(d) When s < λ
2
6(1−λ) then x¯ = 1− (6λ(1− λ)s)1/3.
When s < 1−λ8 then xˆ ≥ λvm for all vm and the decision to continue search will depend upon
the realization of a consumer’s IPMV.


















λ2v2m − 3λvmx− 3λ2vm + 3λvm + 3x2 + 6λx− 6x+ 3λ2 − 6λ+ 3
)
.
Equating this to s and solving for x gives xˆ = 1 − λ + 12λvm −
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12 . As
xˆ ≤ 1 − λ this puts the condition s ≥ λ2v2m6(1−λ) on s. However, when s is sufficiently large
it might happen that 1 − λ + 12λvm −
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12 < λvm for sufficiently small vm,
contradicting xˆ ≥ λvm. In that case there are some consumers who will decide not to continue
search based upon their CPMV, independent of their IPMV. I assume s ≤ 1−λ8 to keep the
model tractable. The expression for x¯ and the conditions imposed on s for case (b) are found
by taking vm = 1 in part (a).





(1− λ+ λvj − x)2
2(1− λ)vm dvj =
(1− λ+ λvm − x)3
6vmλ(1− λ) .
Solving g(xˆ, vm) = s gives xˆ = 1 − λ + λvm − (6vmλ(1 − λ)s)1/3. Setting vm = 1 in this
expression gives x¯. The conditions on s for this case now straightforwardly follow. 
The following Lemma gives explicit versions of ∂D
D
∂pi




Lemma 3. Let vˇ = 1λ
√
6(1− λ)s. For uniformly distributed match values, s ≤ 1−λ8 and
λ ∈ (0, 0.5] the following statements hold.















4vm − 2− 3λvm + 2λ− 3λv2m − 2(2vm − 1)
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12
2(1− λ)2 dvm. (17)







, a situation which can not occur when λ sufficiently large, then
∂DD
∂pi





4vm − 2− 3λvm + 2λ− 3λv2m − 2(2vm − 1)
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12
2(1− λ)2 dvm. (18)
(c) When s ≤ min{1−λ8 , λ
2
6(1−λ)}, then x¯ = 1− (6λ(1− λ)s)1/3 and
∂Dr
∂pi
(pr, pr) = − x¯
3 − 3x¯2 + 3x¯− 16λ3 + 12λ2 − 1
12λ2(1− λ)2 . (19)







, then x¯ = 1− 12λ−
√
2(1− λ)s− λ212 and
∂Dr
∂pi
(pr, pr) = −6(1 + x¯)− 11λ
12(1− λ)2 . (20)
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 2 xˆ = 1 − λ + λvm − (6vmλ(1 − λ)s)1/3 for vm ≥ vˇ and
xˆ = 1− λ+ 12λvm −
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12 for vm < vˇ. First assume vˇ ≤ 1, that is, s ≤ λ
2
6(1−λ) .


























































For n = 2 and uniformly distributed match values the derivative of the last four lines of
22







































































































































Adding (23) to (22) and some algebra leads to the expression given in part (a) of the Lemma.
Part (b) can be derived in a similar fashion and by noticing that vˇ > 1 when s > λ
2
6(1−λ) .


























First suppose s > λ
2












1−λ for all vi, vj ∈ [0, 1]. When one uses m(ti) for the uniform distributions given at the












Combining these findings with (24) and Lemma 2 results in part (d) of the Lemma.





















2λ(1−λ) . Furthermore, using m(ti) as given for
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